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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At the age of five, Cesar Vargas came to the United States with his 
family.1 Since then, Cesar has graduated with honors from both college and 
law school despite lacking access to financial aid, legal employment, and a 
driver’s license.2  Yet, after rating him a “stellar” candidate, the State 
Supreme Court of New York recommended he not be admitted to the New 
York bar because of his status as an undocumented noncitizen.3  Moreover, 
under federal law, he would not be allowed to legally work in any field 
because of his undocumented status.4  Like Cesar, young undocumented 
noncitizens across the country have been unable to pursue their desired 
careers, even if they manage to get the necessary education, because of their 
lack of immigration status.5 
Faced with congressional inaction, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
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1.  Kirk Semple, Bar Exam Passed, Immigrant Still Can’t Practice Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2013, at 
A30. 
2.  Id; 2012–2013 Financial Aid Guide for Undocumented Students, EDUCATORS FOR FAIR 
CONSIDERATION 4, http://www.e4fc.org/images/E4FC_FinAidGuide.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 
2014) (undocumented students are not eligible for federal financial aid, government loans, 
government grants, or work study). 
3.  Semple, supra note 1. 
4.  David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Blocks Bill for Young Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics/19immig.html.  The DREAM Act, which 
“would have created a path to citizenship for certain young illegal immigrants who came to the 
United States as children, completed two years of college or military service and met other 
requirements, including passing a criminal background check,” failed in the Senate after a 55–41 
vote in favor of the bill.  Id. 
5.  JEANNE BATALOVA ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD 
ARRIVALS AT THE ONE-YEAR MARK: A PROFILE OF CURRENTLY ELIGIBLE YOUTH AND 
APPLICANTS 3 (2013), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deferred-action-
childhood-arrivals-one-year-mark-profile-currently-eligible-youth-and (estimating that “up to 1.9 
million unauthorized youth are potentially eligible for DACA” and approximately 1.09 million 
currently meet all the application requirements). 
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(DACA) program in an effort to give young undocumented noncitizens like 
Cesar the opportunity to contribute their skills and education to the American 
community.  Acknowledging that these young noncitizens “lacked the intent 
to violate the law” when they were brought to the United States as children 
and, in many instances, “know only this country as home,” Secretary of 
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano directed the DHS, in exercise of its 
prosecutorial discretion, to grant young undocumented noncitizens deferred 
prosecutorial action and temporary work permits, provided they meet certain 
standards.6 
To date, DHS has granted DACA relief to over 521,825 young 
immigrants who would not otherwise be able to legally work in the United 
States.7  Yet, although DACA recipients enjoy federal work authorization, 
states have adopted policies which restrict the benefits they receive from their 
employment authorization and bar them from pursuing certain professions.  
At least two states, Arizona and Nebraska, have refused to issue driver’s 
licenses to DACA recipients.8  Moreover, there are cases currently on appeal 
in at least two states, one of which is Cesar’s case in New York, where the 
board of admissions to the state’s bar have denied bar admission to DACA 
recipients because of their immigration status.9  These policies treat DACA 
recipients differently from other noncitizens with temporary work permits 
(nonimmigrants).  Yet, it is still unclear what level of review courts should 
apply to Equal Protection challenges arising from these policies because, 
                                                                                                                           
6.  Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec. to David V. Aguilar, Acting 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Enforcement; Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Serv.; and John Morton, Dir., Immigration and Customs Enforcement (June 15, 2012), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-
who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [hereinafter Napolitano Memo]; Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer 
(Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II), 757 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2014) (“To be eligible for DACA, 
immigrants must have come to the United States before the age of sixteen and have been under 
thirty-one years old as of June 15, 2012; they must have been living in the United States when 
DACA was announced and have continuously resided in the United States for at least the previous 
five years; and they must have graduated from high school, or obtained a GED, or have been 
honorably discharged from the United States Armed Forces or the Coast Guard, or be currently 
enrolled in school.  Additionally, they must not pose any threat to public safety: anyone who has 
been convicted of multiple misdemeanors, a single significant misdemeanor, or any felony offense 
is ineligible for DACA.”). 
7.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., NUMBER OF I-821D, CONSIDERATION OF DEFERRED 
ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER, INTAKE, BIOMETRICS AND CASE 
STATUS: 2012-2014 FIRST QUARTER (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.uscis.gov/ 
sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data
/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/DACA-06-02-14.pdf (521,815 DACA requests had been 
approved as of December 31, 2013). 
8.  Are Individuals Granted Deferred Action Under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) Policy Eligible for State Driver’s Licenses?, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., 
http://www.nilc.org/dacadriverslicenses.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
9.  Semple, supra note 1. 
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although the DACA program effectively deems recipients lawfully present,10 
it grants them no immigration status.11 Moreover, courts have not been 
consistent in their review of equal protection challenges for different 
categories of noncitizens.12  Thus, it is imperative that courts apply an 
adequate level of protection to ensure that DACA recipients are not 
discriminated against in a manner that would effectively abrogate the DACA 
program’s purpose of allowing undocumented noncitizen youths the 
opportunity to fully contribute to the American society.  
This Comment will analyze why DACA recipients are entitled to 
heightened scrutiny in equal protection claims by analyzing the different 
levels of scrutiny applied to the various classifications of noncitizens and 
how they provide guidance for an adequate standard of review for DACA 
recipients.  Section II of this Comment will provide an overview of judicial 
decisions in Equal Protection challenges regarding various categories of 
noncitizens.  Section III will then argue that DACA recipients are entitled to 
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Under the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, states cannot “deny 
any person within [their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”13  It 
is well established that noncitizens are “persons” for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, entitled to Equal Protection rights.14 
However, the level of protection afforded to a group depends on the nature 
of the right involved and the group’s status as a suspect, semi-suspect, or 
non-suspect class.15  In the case of noncitizens, courts have reached different 
conclusions about their suspect classification and the applicable level of 
scrutiny, based on their immigration status.16  This Section will discuss 
judicial decisions on Equal Protection challenges involving different types of 
                                                                                                                           
10.  Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II, 757 F.3d at 1059 (“DHS considers DACA recipients not to be unlawfully 
present in the United States because their deferred action is a period of stay authorized by the 
Attorney General.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (2013); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(3) (2013); 
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVS., ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL Ch. 
40.9.2(b)(3)(J), available at http://www.uscis.gov/iframe/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-
1.html). 
11.  Napolitano Memo, supra note 6 (acknowledging the DACA program “confers no substantive right, 
immigration status or pathway to citizenship.  Only the Congress, acting through its legislative 
authority, can confer these rights.”). 
12.  See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); LeClerc v. Webb, 419 
F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005); Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012). 
13.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). 
14.  Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973) (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 
(1971); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 
(1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). 
15.  16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (1998). 
16. See, e.g., Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 729; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216, 223–24; LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 421–22. 
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noncitizens.  First, it will discuss the different levels of scrutiny the courts 
apply in equal protection cases generally.  Then, it will give an overview of 
the various classifications of noncitizens under current immigration law.  
Lastly, it will discuss how courts have applied different levels of scrutiny to 
various classifications of noncitizens. 
A.  Judicial Application of the Equal Protection Clause 
The judicial level of scrutiny applied to an Equal Protection challenge 
depends on the classification of the challenging party and the nature of the 
right affected.17  The Supreme Court has found claims involving certain 
rights to be automatically subject to heightened scrutiny because of their 
fundamental nature.18  Thus far, the Court has found that rights such as the 
right to interstate travel,19 marry,20 procreate,21 and the right for a family to 
live together22 are fundamental and, thus, entitled to strict scrutiny.  
When a challenge does not involve a fundamental right, however, the 
level of judicial review applicable depends on the classification of the injured 
group.23  To determine the classification and whether the class is suspect or 
likely to be discriminated against, courts look to whether there is a history of 
discrimination against the class, the class shares immutable characteristics, 
the class constitutes a discrete and insular minority, and whether the class’s 
shared immutable characteristic has a bearing on its ability to contribute to 
society.24  
When the government action at issue involves disparate treatment of a 
“suspect class” or a fundamental right, courts apply strict scrutiny, which 
requires that the government narrowly tailor its action to further a compelling 
government interest.25  The requirement that the government have a 
compelling purpose in enacting a law that restricts a fundamental right or 
treats a suspect class differently allows courts to ensure “that the legislative 
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect 
                                                                                                                           
17.  Id. 
18.  Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (applying strict scrutiny because the 
state action at issue “involve[d] one of the basic civil rights of man”). 
19.  Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969). 
20.  Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (acknowledging that “freedom of 
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life” is a fundamental right protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
23.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor 
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational 
relation to some legitimate end.”). 
24.  See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
25.  16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (1998). 
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tool.”26  The narrow tailoring requirement, then, mandates that the action be 
neither over-inclusive nor under-inclusive and, thus, ensures that the 
government uses the least restrictive or discriminatory means of achieving 
its compelling interest.27 
When a challenge does not involve a fundamental right and the court 
finds a classification to be “semi-suspect,” it will apply intermediate scrutiny, 
which requires that the government action further an important government 
interest and that the action be substantially related to that important interest.28  
A classification will be semi-suspect when, although not immediately 
suspect, it is entitled to heightened scrutiny based on the factors listed above.  
Once a semi-suspect classification has been established, the requirement that 
the state’s interest be an important one ensures that the government action is 
not based on generalizations and stereotypes of the class.29  Moreover, by 
requiring that the action be substantially related to the state’s important 
purpose, courts ensure that the state action is more than rationally related to 
the purpose but do not require that it be narrowly tailored.30 
Lastly, when a court finds that a classification is not suspect and the 
challenge does not involve a fundamental right, the court will apply rational 
basis scrutiny, which requires only that the government action be rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.31  A legitimate end is one “within the 
scope of the constitution.”32 
B.  Noncitizen Categories Under Current Immigration Law 
Under current immigration law, noncitizens are divided into three major 
categories: lawful permanent residents (LPRs), nonimmigrants, and 
undocumented noncitizens.  LPRs are noncitizens who have legal permits 
allowing them to remain in the United States permanently.33  Nonimmigrants, 
on the other hand, have only temporary permission to remain in the United 
States.34  Nonimmigrants include noncitizens present in the United States as 
“temporary workers, students, foreign diplomats, tourists, and business 
                                                                                                                           
26.  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
27.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
28.  16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (1998). 
29.  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976). 
30.  See Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981). 
31.  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within 
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that 
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.”). 
32.  Id. 
33.  Ariel Subourne, Alienage As A Suspect Class: Nonimmigrants and the Equal Protection Clause, 10 
SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 199, 205 (2013). 
34.  Id.  
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travelers.”35  Lastly, undocumented noncitizens are those who do not have 
permission to be present in the United States either because they entered 
illegally or because their permits have expired.36 
C.  Judicial Application of Equal Protection Standards of Review to 
Noncitizens 
The difficulty in determining the appropriate standards of review for 
DACA recipients arises partly as a result of the patchwork of judicial 
decisions applying different levels of scrutiny to different categories of 
noncitizens. This Section describes that case law. 
1.  Lawful Permanent Residents and the Equal Protection Clause: In re 
Griffiths37 
In Griffiths, the Supreme Court analyzed Connecticut’s rule barring 
noncitizens from the practice of law.38  Specifically, the Court reviewed 
Connecticut’s bar examining committee’s decision to deny Griffiths, an LPR, 
permission to take the state bar exam solely on the basis of her immigration 
status.39  
Acknowledging that “the right to work . . . is of the very essence of the 
personal freedom and opportunity that was the purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to secure,”40 the Court began its analysis reiterating the well-
settled standing of alienage-based classifications as inherently suspect and, 
as such, entitled to strict scrutiny.41  Subject to this standard of review, a state 
                                                                                                                           
35.  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  This Comment will also refer to noncitizens granted deferred 
action and/or temporary work authorization as nonimmigrants.  Noncitizens granted deferred action 
include DACA recipients, “individuals suffering serious medical conditions”[,] and “persons 
temporarily prevented from returning to their home country due to a natural disaster, among others.” 
CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. OMBUDSMAN, DEFERRED ACTION: RECOMMNEDATIONS TO 
IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND CONSISTENCY IN THE USCIS PROCESS (2011), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cisomb-combined-dar.pdf.  Other noncitizens granted 
temporary work authorization include refugees, asylees, trafficking victims granted T-visas, 
domestic violence victims granted relief under the Violence Against Women Act, and victims of 
other crimes granted U-visas.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR I-765, APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION 1-6 (2013). 
36. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVS., CITIZENSHIP AND ALIEN STATUS 
DEFINITIONS (2014), available at http://www.dshs.wa.gov/manuals/eaz/sections/ 
CitizenshipAndAlienStatus/citizengenelig.shtml (defining “undocumented aliens” as “noncitizens 
without a lawful immigration status” who either “[e]ntered the U.S. illegally” or “[w]ere lawfully 
admitted but whose status expired or was revoked per United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services.”). 
37.  In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). 
38.  Id. at 718. 
39.  Id. at 720. 
40.  Id. at 721. 
41.  Id. (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)). 
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must show that its action is grounded on an interest that is “both 
constitutionally permissible and substantial” and that the means, or 
classification, it employs are necessary to accomplish or safeguard its 
substantial interest.42 
The Court found that Connecticut’s interest in ensuring that licensed 
attorneys be qualified to practice law is substantial.43  However, this interest 
did not justify barring noncitizens from the practice of law.44  In reaching its 
decision, the Court found that, since the practice of law does not engage 
governmental affairs, an attorney’s alienage does not contravene the interest 
of the United States in such a manner that would require barring noncitizens 
from law practice.45  Moreover, the Court reasoned that, although lawyers are 
“officers of the court,” they are not officers “in the ordinary sense.”46  Rather, 
lawyers are autonomous, private professionals who, although engaged in 
court proceedings, are not agents of the government.47  Thus, the Court 
concluded that Connecticut’s rule barring noncitizens from law practice was 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and established the strict 
level of review applicable to noncitizens in Equal Protection challenges. 
Since then, however, courts have found that the strict scrutiny applied in 
Griffiths does not apply to all noncitizens. 
2.  Undocumented Noncitizens and the Equal Protection Clause:  Plyler v. 
Doe48 
The most marked difference within the different categories of 
noncitizens is between LPRs and undocumented noncitizens.  In Plyler v. 
Doe, the Supreme Court acknowledged this difference and analyzed its 
implications regarding the standard of review applicable to Equal Protection 
challenges.49  The Court reviewed a class action challenge brought by 
undocumented children to the constitutionality of a Texas statute that 
effectively denied them a public education by authorizing school districts to 
deny enrollment to undocumented children and to withhold state funds for 
their education to those school districts that did allow them to enroll.50 
The Court began its analysis by rejecting the State’s argument that, 
because of their undocumented status, the plaintiffs were not “persons within 
its jurisdiction” and, therefore, not entitled to protection under the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                                           
42.  Id. at 721–22. 
43.  Id. at 725. 
44.  Id. at 729. 
45.  Id. at 724. 
46.  Id. at 728. 
47.  Id. at 728–29. 
48.  457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
49.  Id.  
50.  Id. at 205–06. 
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Amendment.51  First, the Court emphasized that, “[w]hatever his status under 
the immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in the ordinary sense of 
that term” and, consequently, for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.52  
Further, the Court concluded, undocumented noncitizens are persons “within 
[a State’s] jurisdiction” because Congress intended for that language to 
guarantee “equal protection to all within a State’s boundaries,” regardless of 
whether his or her “initial entry into [the] State, or into the United States, was 
unlawful.”53 
Having established that undocumented noncitizens are protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was faced with establishing a proper 
standard of review for this class.  The Court concluded that, unlike LPRs, 
undocumented noncitizens “cannot be treated as a suspect class because their 
presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional 
irrelevancy.’”54  Moreover, the Court found that public education, although 
of upmost importance to society, is not a fundamental right.55  Based on these 
findings, the Court concluded that undocumented noncitizens, even in the 
education context, are only entitled to rational basis review in Equal 
Protection challenges.56  
The Court acknowledged, however, that undocumented minors, who 
are unable to affect “[]either their parents’ conduct []or their own status,” are 
not comparably situated to undocumented adults who violated immigration 
laws of their own accord and have the ability to return to their home 
countries.57  Because of this, courts may take into account the “costs to the 
Nation and to the innocent children” when determining the rationality of a 
state action and afford them a higher level of scrutiny than that applied to 
undocumented noncitizens generally.58  Here, the Court found that barring 
undocumented children from public education would contravene the goal of 
the Equal Protection Clause to prevent unreasonable government-imposed 
“obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit”59 and impose “a 
lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their 
disabling status.”60  Thus, the Court concluded, the state action can “hardly 
be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal.”61  
                                                                                                                           
51.  Id. at 210. 
52.  Id.  
53.  Id. at 214–15. 
54.  Id. at 223. 
55.  Id. at 222–23. 
56.  See id. at 216, 223–24. 
57.  Id. at 220. 
58.  Id. at 223–24. 
59.  Id. at 221–22. 
60.  Id. at 223. 
61.  Id. at 224 (emphasis added). 
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By requiring that the state action be rationally related to a substantial 
state purpose, the Court established a higher standard of review for 
undocumented minors in the education context than the rational basis review 
applicable to undocumented noncitizens in general.  This standard of review 
requires that the state action be rationally related to a legitimate, rather than 
substantial, end.  Yet, even this more nuanced review of noncitizens’ 
protection under the Equal Protection Clause failed to encompass the entire 
spectrum of noncitizen classifications and left the door open for courts to 
apply a different standard of review to those noncitizens who, although 
lawfully present, lack permanent resident status. 
3.  Nonimmigrants and the Equal Protection Clause: A Split Approach 
Currently, federal circuit courts are split as to the standard of review 
applicable to nonimmigrants in Equal Protection cases.  On one side, the 
Appellate Courts for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have found that 
nonimmigrants are only entitled to rational basis review.  The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, however, has held that nonimmigrants are entitled to strict 
scrutiny. 
a.  Rational Basis Review: LeClerc v. Webb62 
In LeClerc, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed an Equal 
Protection challenge to a Louisiana Supreme Court Rule that required an 
applicant for admission to the state bar to be either a U.S. citizen or LPR.63 
Here, the court began by acknowledging the Supreme Court’s rationale for 
applying strict scrutiny to LPRs, their inability to affect the political process 
in favor of their interests and their similarities to United States citizens.64  The 
court found, however, that because of the temporary nature of their status, 
nonimmigrants need not be considered a suspect class.65  
Moreover, the court distinguished nonimmigrants from Plyler and the 
heightened standard of review afforded to undocumented minors there. 
Unlike the plaintiffs in Plyler, the court reasoned, the nonimmigrant plaintiffs 
in this case “entered this country voluntarily and with an understanding of 
their limited, temporary status.”66  Thus, the unfair consequences which 
moved the court to grant heightened scrutiny to undocumented minors were 
not present here.67  As a result, the court applied rational basis scrutiny and 
                                                                                                                           
62.  419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005). 
63.  Id. at 410. 
64.  Id. at 417. 
65.  Id. at 417–18. 
66.  Id. at 420. 
67.  Id. at 420–21. 
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found the Louisiana Supreme Court Rule constitutional as it is rationally 
related to the legitimate state purpose of regulating the practice of law.68  
Since LeClerc, at least one other circuit court has borrowed the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning to find that nonimmigrants are entitled only to rational basis 
review.69  
b.  Dandamudi v.Tisch70 
In Dandamudi, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the 
constitutionality of a New York statute requiring U.S. citizenship or legal 
permanent residence to obtain a pharmacist’s license.71  The court began its 
opinion acknowledging that, although most nonimmigrants are required to 
establish their lack of intent to permanently stay in the United States to obtain 
their nonimmigrant visas, both the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and 
the State Department recognize the “doctrine of dual intent, which allows 
aliens to express an intention to remain in the United States temporarily . . . 
while also intending to remain permanently.”72  
Further, the court restated the Supreme Court holdings that “alienage is 
a suspect classification” and that, when a state action “interferes with the 
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a 
suspect class,” it must be subject to strict scrutiny.73  Moreover, the court here 
found that the Supreme Court has established only two exceptions to the view 
that alienage is a suspect class.74  One exception allows for state exclusion of 
noncitizens from “political and governmental functions.”75  The other 
exception allows for courts to apply rational basis review to challenges 
involving undocumented noncitizens.76  Thus, the court found that the 
Supreme Court has not made any exceptions or distinctions between lawfully 
present noncitizens.77  Accordingly, the Second Circuit Court refused to 
carve out a third exception and held that nonimmigrants, like LPRs, are a 
suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny.78 
In reaching its decision, the court declined to follow LeClerc and 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen’s 
                                                                                                                           
68.  Id. at 421–22. 
69.  See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(adopting LeClerc’s reasoning to find that strict scrutiny only applies to LPRs). 
70.  686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012). 
71.  Id. at 69 (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6805(1)(6) (McKinney 2014)). 
72.  Id. at 70. 
73.  Id. at 72. 
74.  Id. at 73. 
75.  Id. (citing Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1978) (applying rational basis review and 
upholding a statute prohibiting noncitizens to work as police officers)). 
76.  Id. at 74 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)). 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. at 79. 
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assumption that, because nonimmigrants have only temporary interests in the 
United States, they are not on equal footing with LPRs.  First, the court 
reasoned that this finding would be fundamentally inconsistent with the BIA 
and State Department’s doctrine of dual intent.79  Further, the court 
concluded that the Supreme Court recognizes noncitizens as a suspect class 
not because of their similarities to United States citizens or their obligations 
to the country but because of their vulnerable status as a discrete and insular 
minority unable to affect the political process.80  In fact, the court found that 
nonimmigrants are “more powerless and vulnerable” than their LPR 
counterparts.81  
Lastly, the court concluded, applying rational basis scrutiny to 
nonimmigrants would create “absurd results” because it would effectively 
afford less protection to lawfully present nonimmigrants than that afforded 
to undocumented minors in Plyler.82  This analysis, however, becomes more 
complex in the case of DACA recipients who, although lawfully present, 
unlawfully entered the country and have been granted no immigration status. 
4.  DACA Recipients and the Equal Protection Clause: Arizona Dream Act 
Coalition v. Brewer83 
To date, Arizona Dream Act Coalition is the only decision regarding an 
Equal Protection challenge to a state action discriminating against DACA 
recipients.  The Arizona Dream Act Coalition, a youth-led immigration 
advocacy group, along with a number of DACA recipients, brought suit 
against the State of Arizona challenging the constitutionality of its policy to 
deny driver’s licenses to DACA recipients.84  The Plaintiffs asked the District 
Court of Arizona for a preliminary injunction barring the State of Arizona 
from continuing its policy.85  Although the District Court of Arizona denied 
the preliminary injunction, on appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, granting Plaintiffs’ 
motion for preliminary injunction.86  Since this was the first time a federal 
district and appellate court spoke on the issue of which standard of review 
should be applied to DACA recipients, it is an interesting preview of what 
the District Court of Arizona will ultimately hold on the issue and what other 
courts may decide. 
                                                                                                                           
79.  Id. at 77. 
80.  Id. at 75. 
81.  Id. at 77. 
82.  Id. at 78. 
83.  Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014). 
84.  Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer (Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I), 945 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1052 (D. Ariz. 
2013). 
85. Id. at 1053.  
86. Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II, 757 F.3d at 1075. 
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After the DACA program came into effect, Arizona Governor Jan 
Brewer issued an executive order barring DACA recipients “from obtaining 
eligibility, beyond those available to any person regardless of lawful status, 
for any taxpayer-funded public benefits and state identification, including a 
driver’s license.”87  As a result, DACA recipients, who receive employment 
authorization documents (EADs) as part of the DACA program, would be 
denied driver’s licenses in Arizona while other EAD-holding noncitizens 
would be allowed to continue to receive driver’s licenses.88  Thus, the court 
found that DACA recipients were similarly situated to other EAD holders, 
despite the differences in deferred action programs, yet treated differently.89 
Having established the existence of disparate treatment, the court then 
analyzed the level of scrutiny applicable under the Equal Protection analysis.  
First, the court analyzed whether Plaintiffs are entitled to strict scrutiny.  In 
so doing, the court looked at Supreme Court decisions, finding that the 
Supreme Court’s rationale in holding alienage as a suspect class was 
grounded on the “similarities between legal resident aliens and citizens” such 
as the fact that LPRs pay taxes, may be drafted into the army, and may live, 
work, and contribute to the economy of a state for an extended period of 
time.90  Thus, based on Plaintiffs’ dissimilarities to United States citizens, the 
court decided to follow the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ decisions in LULAC and 
LeClerc to conclude that Plaintiffs are not entitled to strict scrutiny.91  
Having rejected strict scrutiny, the court then analyzed whether 
Plaintiffs are entitled to intermediate scrutiny.  First, the court acknowledged 
intermediate scrutiny may apply to “plaintiffs who (1) have suffered a history 
of discrimination; (2) exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing 
characteristics that define them as a distinct group; and (3) show that they are 
a minority or politically powerless.”92  The court concluded, however, that 
because of the recency of the DACA program, Plaintiffs cannot establish they 
have suffered a history of discrimination.93 Moreover, the court noted, the 
DACA program itself disproves Plaintiffs’ political powerlessness since it 
shows that they “have attracted the attention of policymakers in the federal 
government.”94 
Next, the court looked at the “hybrid form of review” applied to 
undocumented minors in Plyler to decide whether it may apply to Plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                           
87.  Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 1055. 
88.  Id. at 1060 (noncitizens may receive EADs as part of other deferred action programs). 
89.  Id. at 1062 (“[a]ll deferred action recipients are permitted to remain in the country without removal 
for a temporary period of time”). 
90.  Id. at 1062. 
91.  Id. at 1065. 
92.  Id.  
93.  Id. at 1066. 
94.  Id. 
2014]  Comment 117 
 
here.95  In doing so, the court pointed to two facts that justified the heightened 
scrutiny in Plyler: “(1) the age of the undocumented children . . . , and (2) the 
importance of education to those children and the entire nation.”96  Based on 
those facts, the court found that Plaintiffs here are not entitled to hybrid 
heightened scrutiny because they are not minor children and driver’s licenses 
do not have the same importance to Plaintiffs and the nation as primary 
education since they are not “the basic tools by which individuals might lead 
economically productive lives to the benefit of us all.”97 
Thus, the court concluded that Plaintiffs are not a suspect or quasi-
suspect class and are, therefore, only entitled to rational basis review.98  In 
reviewing the likelihood of success of Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection challenge 
to Arizona’s policy, the court acknowledged the statements of Governor 
Brewer regarding the DACA program, which point to her motives for issuing 
the executive order barring DACA recipients from driver’s licenses.99  Then 
the court concluded that, although Governor Brewer is entitled to disagree 
with the federal government, she lacked a rational basis for issuing the 
executive order.100  Therefore, based on this preliminary analysis, the court 
found that Arizona’s policy is likely to fail a rational basis review.101  The 
court, however, ultimately denied Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
injunction on the basis that Plaintiffs are unlikely to suffer irreparable 
harm.102 
After the district court’s finding that Arizona’s policy was likely to fail 
even under a rational basis standard, Arizona revised its discriminatory 
policy in an effort to survive this most deferential test.  To pass constitutional 
muster, Arizona decided to simply widen their net of discrimination, refusing 
driver’s licenses to other deferred action recipients.103 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit framed Plaintiffs’ 
claim narrowly, finding that DACA recipients are “similarly situated to other 
categories of noncitizens who may use Employment Authorization 
Documents to obtain driver’s licenses in Arizona.”104  Based on this framing, 
the court concluded that, because Arizona’s policy denies driver’s licenses to 
                                                                                                                           
95.  Id.; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (requiring that the state action be rationally related to 
a substantial state goal). 
96.  Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 1066. 
97.  Id.  
98. Id.  
99.  Id. at 1070 (“The Governor strongly criticized the program as ‘back door amnesty’ and political 
‘pandering’ . . . and her comments show that she disagreed with the federal government’s 
conclusion that DACA recipients are now authorized by federal law to be present in the country 
referring to them as ‘illegal people.’”). 
100.  Id. at 1071–72. 
101.  Id. at 1072. 
102.  Id. at 1074. 
103.  See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II, 757 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2014). 
104.  Id. at 1064. 
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some categories of EAD holders, the policy treats DACA recipients 
disparately.105  Having concluded that Arizona’s policy discriminates against 
DACA recipients, the court found that it did not need to “decide what 
standard of scrutiny applies to Defendants’ policy: as the district court 
concluded, Defendants’ policy is likely to fail even rational basis review.”106  
Yet, the court acknowledged the long-standing principle that alienage is a 
suspect classification only subject to rational basis review when the persons 
targeted by the discriminatory actions are unlawfully present in the 
country.107  Ultimately, Arizona Dream Act Coalition illustrates both the 
difficulty in establishing an appropriate level of scrutiny for DACA 
recipients and the importance to do so. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Griffiths and Plyler, DACA 
recipients’ Equal Protection challenges should be afforded heightened 
scrutiny.  This Section will first analyze why DACA recipients and other 
lawfully present noncitizens should be afforded strict scrutiny.  In the 
alternative, it will argue that DACA recipients should be afforded 
intermediate scrutiny.   Lastly, this Section will argue that, at a minimum, 
DACA recipients should be afforded Plyler’s heightened scrutiny. 
A.  DACA Recipients Are Entitled to Strict Scrutiny 
It is well-established that alienage is a suspect classification for 
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.108  This principle has not been 
abandoned or redefined.109  Although some courts have decided that 
nonimmigrants are only entitled to rational basis scrutiny,110 that reasoning 
is flawed.  
                                                                                                                           
105.  Id.  
106.  Id. at 1065. 
107.  Id. at 1065 n. 4 (“Though we need not decide what standard of scrutiny to apply here, we note that 
the Supreme Court has consistently required the application of strict scrutiny to state action that 
discriminates against noncitizens authorized to be present in the United States. Conversely, 
alienage-based discrimination is subject to rational basis review only when the aliens targeted by 
that discrimination are “presen[t] in this country in violation of federal law.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
108.  Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (equating classifications based on alienage to 
other immediately suspect classifications such as race and nationality and finding that “[a]liens as 
a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular minority . . . for whom [strict scrutiny] is 
appropriate.”). 
109.  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (distinguishing undocumented noncitizens from 
noncitizens in general only because of their unlawful presence).  
110.  See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 421 (5th Cir. 2005); League of United Latin Am. Citizens 
(LULAC) v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I, 945 F. 
Supp. 2d 1049, 1050 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
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First, the decisions holding that nonimmigrants are only entitled to 
rational basis scrutiny misinterpret the Supreme Court’s holding in Plyler. 
Those decisions are based on the notion that, in Plyler, the Supreme Court 
established that alienage only entitles a group of noncitizens to suspect class 
status when the group involves LPRs.111  This is a misreading because the 
Court did not hold that some types of alienage are suspect and others are not.  
Instead, the Court carved out a narrow exception for undocumented 
noncitizens based solely on their unlawful presence.112  
Nowhere in its decisions does the Supreme Court create a sliding scale 
of protection for noncitizens based on their immigration status.  The only 
relevant factors are those which the Court has consistently used in 
determining whether a class is suspect, the history of discrimination against 
the class, shared immutable characteristics among members of the class, the 
class’s status as a discrete and insular minority, and whether the class’s 
shared immutable characteristics have a barring in its ability to contribute to 
society.113  Based on these factors, even undocumented noncitizens would be 
a suspect class but for their unlawful presence.114  It follows, then, that in 
reviewing an equal protection challenge involving DACA recipients, who are 
effectively deemed lawfully present in the United States, a court must apply 
strict scrutiny. 
Further, the decisions in LeClerc and LULAC erroneously focus on the 
dissimilarities between lawfully present noncitizens and the undocumented 
noncitizens in Plyler.115  In Plyler, the Court highlighted the importance of 
education both to the noncitizen minors and to the American society.116 
While it is true that the policy considerations that led the Supreme Court to 
apply a heightened level of scrutiny in Plyler are not present in the cases 
involving nonimmigrants,117 this is irrelevant because alienage in itself 
entitles a class to strict scrutiny.  The Supreme Court in Plyler did not 
establish those policy considerations as factors for finding a noncitizen 
classification suspect.  Rather, it used them only after finding that the 
                                                                                                                           
111.  LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 419 (“[A]lthough aliens are a suspect class in general, they are not 
homogeneous and precedent does not support the proposition that nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect 
class entitled to . . . strict scrutiny.”). 
112.  See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223; Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II, 757 F.3d 1053, 1065 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“Though we need not decide what standard of scrutiny to apply here, we note that the Supreme 
Court has consistently required the application of strict scrutiny to state action that discriminates 
against noncitizens authorized to be present in the United States.  Conversely, alienage-based 
discrimination is subject to rational basis review only when the aliens targeted by that 
discrimination are present in this country in violation of federal law.”) (internal citations omitted). 
113.  See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
114.  Id. 
115.  See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 418-19; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC), 500 F.3d 
at 533 (adopting LeClerc’s rationale). 
116.  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220-23. 
117.  Id. (acknowledging the importance of education and finding that undocumented minors are not 
similarly situated to undocumented adults because they did not willingly violate immigration law). 
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plaintiffs’ unlawful presence barred them from suspect status.118  Thus, where 
a noncitizen’s presence in the United States is lawful, a court need not engage 
in an analysis of Plyler’s policy considerations because alienage, in itself, is 
a suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny. 
Moreover, courts applying rational basis erroneously engaged in a 
similarity analysis to find that nonimmigrants are not a suspect class.  In 
Arizona Dream Act Coalition I, the Arizona District Court followed the 
reasoning of LeClerc to find that, because nonimmigrants do not pay taxes, 
may be drafted into the army, or live, work, and contribute to the economy 
of a state for an extended period of time, they are not entitled to the same 
strict scrutiny as LPRs.119  That is, the court found that, unlike LPRs who are 
sufficiently similar to United States citizens, nonimmigrants are not and, 
therefore, cannot be said to be considered a suspect class.  This reasoning 
disregards the long-standing principle that alienage, not lawful permanent 
residence, is a suspect classification.  In finding alienage suspect, the 
Supreme Court did not engage in a similarity analysis.  It looked at factors 
such as the political powerlessness of aliens and their standing as a discrete 
and insular minority.120  
Alienage, in itself, is a suspect classification because all the relevant 
factors point to its vulnerability.121  None of those factors, however, require 
that the class share characteristics with a non-targeted group.  Rather, they 
emphasize the differences between a “discrete and insular” minority from the 
majority. To require that a targeted minority be like a majority of the people 
in society in order to be protected from discrimination would contravene the 
very purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, which seeks to protect 
disenfranchised minorities from the tyranny of the majority. Therefore, 
DACA recipients, like other lawfully present noncitizens, are entitled to strict 
scrutiny regardless of Plyler considerations or their dissimilarities with 
United States citizens. 
B.  DACA Recipients, if Not Suspect, Are Entitled to Intermediate Scrutiny 
Even if a court were to find that certain classes of lawfully present 
noncitizens are not entitled to suspect classification, it would still be required 
to apply intermediate scrutiny.  When a class is not immediately suspect, a 
court must look at “(1) the history of invidious discrimination against the 
class; (2) whether the characteristics that distinguish the class [affect its 
members’] ability to contribute to society; (3) whether the distinguishing 
characteristic is “immutable” or beyond the class members’ control; and (4) 
                                                                                                                           
118.  Id. at 223. 
119.  Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1062 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
120.  Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
121.  See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
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the political power of the subject class”122 to determine whether the class is 
entitled to heightened scrutiny.  In applying these factors, a court must find 
that DACA recipients are entitled to intermediate scrutiny.  
First, DACA recipients share the immutable characteristics of having 
been brought to the United States as children and living in the United States 
in violation of immigration laws.  Although they may someday gain lawful 
status, their upbringing will remain unchanged.  These are young people who, 
because of their upbringing as undocumented noncitizens, have not had the 
same opportunities as their lawfully present counterparts.  In many states, 
they lacked the opportunity to attend college at in-state tuition rates and, in 
the few states which extend in-state tuition benefits, they still lacked access 
to federal financial aid, student loans, and legal employment to help defray 
the costs of their education.123  Although the DACA program now allows 
them access to lawful employment and they may someday gain an 
immigration status through congressional action, this will not change the 
psychological scars and loss of opportunities that their undocumented 
upbringing will leave behind. 
Further, they share a characteristic that is beyond their control because, 
under current immigration laws, they do not have a path to citizenship and, 
thus, cannot control their status as noncitizens.  However, this shared and 
immutable characteristic does not bear on their ability to contribute to 
society, especially after receiving a work permit as a result of DACA.  The 
policies that seek to curtail their DACA benefits do, however, affect their 
ability to contribute to society by denying them state benefits such as 
professional and driver’s licenses.  Thus, the first two factors point to DACA 
recipients being entitled to heightened scrutiny. 
Moreover, a court need only look at long standing history as well as the 
more recent horde of anti-immigrant legislation to find a history of 
discrimination of noncitizens.  Throughout the country, state and local 
governments have enacted legislation seeking to force undocumented 
noncitizens out of their jurisdiction.124  Many of these laws have been found 
                                                                                                                           
122.  16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (1998). 
123.  Undocumented Student Tuition: Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 5, 
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/undocumented-student-tuition-overview.aspx. 
Currently, three states explicitly prohibit undocumented students from paying in-state tuition; 
seventeen states allow undocumented students to qualify for in-state tuition; and five states, all of 
which extend in-state tuition to undocumented students, also allow them to receive state financial 
aid. Id. See also Advising Undocumented Students, COLLEGE BOARD, 
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/guidance/financial-aid/undocumented-students (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2014) (undocumented students do not qualify for federal financial aid, state financial aid 
in most states, or most private scholarships). 
124.  Heidi Beirich, Essay: The Anti-Immigrant Movement, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/anti-immigrant/the-anti-
immigrant-movement (last visited Apr. 16, 2014); see, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012) (upholding Arizona law which allows state police to detain anyone they have a 
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unconstitutional.  Based on the repeated unconstitutional and discriminatory 
action of state and local governments, it is clear that noncitizens should be 
found to be a suspect class. 
Lastly, DACA recipients continue to lack access to the political process 
and remain powerless.  First, noncitizens are ineligible to vote in federal 
elections and are overwhelmingly excluded from voting at the state and local 
level.125  Thus, they have no direct access to the political process. Further 
proof of their powerlessness is the continued failure of the DREAM Act in 
Congress as well as Congress’s lack of action regarding the enactment of a 
comprehensive immigration reform bill, despite immigrant activism.126  The 
court in Arizona Dream Act Coalition found that the DACA program itself 
is proof that noncitizens, particularly DREAMers, have a strong influence on 
the political process.127  In fact, however, the DACA program was started to 
ameliorate Congressional inaction.  It, in no way, replaces the Congressional 
action for which DREAMers have been advocating.  By providing them with 
only two-year temporary work permits, the DACA program provides only a 
short-term solution and effectively leaves DACA recipients at the mercy of 
changing political environments and executive administrations.  Thus, courts 
should find that, based on a factor analysis, DACA recipients are entitled to 
intermediate scrutiny.  Yet, even if a court were to disagree, DACA recipients 
are still entitled to some kind of heightened scrutiny. 
C.  DACA Recipients Are, at Minimum, Entitled to Plyler’s Heightened 
Scrutiny 
In Plyler, the Supreme Court applied a heightened rational basis 
scrutiny to undocumented minors finding that, although their unlawful 
presence precluded them from suspect status, it is in the best interest of the 
United States to grant them heightened protection in the education context.128  
                                                                                                                           
“reasonable suspicion” to believe is unlawfully present in the country); Ga. Latino Alliance for 
Human Rights v. Deal, 691 F.3d 1250, 1268 (11th Cir. 2012) (denying preliminary injunction of 
Georgia law similar to Arizona’s); Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d 
1236, 1245–46 (concluding that a section of Alabama law requiring verification of citizenship and 
immigration status of enrolling students was subject to heightened scrutiny and holding that the 
section violated the Equal Protection clause); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 
2013) (striking down anti-immigrant housing and employment ordinances). 
125.  See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical 
Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391 (1993). 
126.  Herszenhorn, supra note 4; Wesley Lowery, House Democrats Need 27 Signatures to Force Vote 
on Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2014, 12:09 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/04/15/house-democrats-need-27-
signatures-to-force-vote-on-comprehensive-immigration-reform-bill/. 
127.  Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1066 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
128.  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220–23 (1982). 
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Based on the Court’s rationale in that case, DACA recipients are entitled to 
the same heightened rational basis scrutiny. 
First, the plaintiffs Plyler sought to protect are the very same group who 
now benefit from DACA.  It is not a great leap to imagine the same kind of 
undocumented children whose public school attendance Plyler sought to 
protect growing up, graduating high school or serving in the United States 
armed forces, and now being eligible for DACA relief.  Having protected 
their access to public education as children in the interest of the country, it 
would now be inconsistent to curb their ability to contribute the skills and 
education they have gained in the United States back to the community.   
Moreover, like the plaintiffs in Plyler, DACA recipients had no intent 
to violate immigration law when their families brought them to the United 
States as children.  Some younger DACA recipients may not even have any 
accumulated unlawful presence129 and the rest, although unlawfully present 
at some point, are now effectively deemed lawfully present in the country for 
the duration of their work authorization.130  Thus, DACA recipients share the 
same factors that led the Court to apply heightened scrutiny in Plyler.  
Although most DACA recipients are now adults and could, thus, be said 
to be able to change their condition as undocumented noncitizens unlike the 
children in Plyler, it is unreasonable to expect them to do so. These young 
people were brought to the United States as children.  Since then, they have 
grown to know only the United States as their home.131  They have grown up 
American in almost every sense; they have attended the same schools, played 
the same sports, listened to the same music, and shared in the same culture 
as every other American child.  But for the actions of their parents and 
inaction of Congress, they are American.  To hold that they are entitled to 
less scrutiny simply because they grew up is unreasonable. 
Ultimately, it is important to afford DACA recipients, and all lawfully 
present noncitizens, heightened scrutiny because failing to do so would allow 
a legislature to simply widen their net of discrimination to survive rational 
basis review.  In Arizona Dream Act Coalition, where the court applied 
rational basis review to Arizona’s denial of driver’s licenses to DACA 
recipients, the court advised that Arizona could continue to deny driver’s 
                                                                                                                           
129.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii-iii) (2013) (“[A]n alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the 
United States if the alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the [authorized]  
period of stay . . . or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.”  However, 
“[n]o period of time in which an alien is under 18 years of age shall be taken into account in 
determining the period of unlawful presence in the United States.”). 
130.  See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (“[N]othing about [DACA] suggests that 
DACA recipients are somehow less authorized to be present in the United States than are other 
deferred action recipients . . . All deferred action recipients are permitted to remain in the country 
without removal for a temporary period of time, and the EADs held by those recipients appear to 
be valid only for a temporary period.”). 
131.  See Napolitano Memo, supra note 6. 
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licenses to DACA recipients only if it also denies them to other deferred 
actions recipients.132  That piece of judicial guidance may have seemed far-
fetched at the time of the decision.  After all, it was difficult to imagine that 
a state would deny driver’s licenses to deferred action recipients, such as 
asylees and victims of domestic violence and human trafficking, just because 
it disagreed with the DACA program.133  Yet, that is exactly what happened 
in Arizona.  After the district court indicated that, even under rational basis 
scrutiny, Arizona’s policy was likely to be found discriminatory, Governor 
Brewer decided to follow the court’s guidance and deny driver’s licenses to 
all deferred action recipients.134 
While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately found that even 
this revised policy is not likely to survive the most deferential standard of 
review, it did so employing a very narrow framing of the issue. That is, the 
court found the Arizona policy treated DACA recipients disparately from 
other EAD holders.135  The danger in this approach, however, is that it 
provides an incentive for states to simply widen their net of discrimination to 
pass constitutional muster.  Therefore, to effectively protect DACA 
recipients and other noncitizens from discriminatory state practices courts 
must acknowledge alienage, whatever its type, as a suspect class and afford 
all lawfully present noncitizens an appropriately heightened level of scrutiny.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Alienage classifications, regardless of the type of lawfully present 
noncitizens at issue, are immediately suspect.  Therefore, courts should apply 
strict scrutiny.  In the alternative, courts should find that DACA recipients 
are a discrete and insular minority entitled to intermediate scrutiny.  Lastly, 
even if a court refuses to apply either of those standards of review, DACA 
recipients are, at a minimum, entitled to a lesser, heightened scrutiny above 
rational basis.  For the foregoing reasons, Equal Protection challenges 
involving DACA recipients are entitled to heightened scrutiny. 
 
                                                                                                                           
132.  Id.  
133.  See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
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135.  Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II, 757 F.3d 1053, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014). 
